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I.   INTRODUCTION 
  
    
   ith the success and future of the “Minsk II” Agreement1 still uncertain, 
world attention is currently centered on the armed conflict in southeastern 
Ukraine. This conflict has brought about the most serious post-Cold War 
security crisis between the Russian Federation and the West to date. In con-
trast, the situation of Crimea rarely makes headlines these days.2 But not-
withstanding current security priorities in eastern Ukraine, Crimea is, of 
course, an integral part of the current crisis and a key element and decisive 
bargaining chip in attempts to broker a peace for Ukraine.  
From the perspective of international law, accepting Russia’s “absorp-
tion” of Crimea is wholly inconceivable. It would severely, perhaps even 
fatally, undermine Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the international le-
gal security architecture as a whole. And it would thereby set a dangerous 
precedent, especially if President Putin should continue to turn his Soviet 
Union (USSR) nostalgia into action. However, from a political perspective 
and if peace in Ukraine is to remain a realistic prospect, somehow accepting 
Crimea’s incorporation into the Russian Federation, albeit highly undesira-
ble, to some observers seems almost inevitable.3 According to them it may 
be the price to pay for unheeding NATO enlargement and eastward Euro-
pean Union (EU) expansion in disregard of realpolitik considerations.4 It 
appears that at least tacitly—and in some cases explicitly—some Western 
                                                                                                                      
1. The February 11, 2015 agreement between the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France 
and Germany was also signed by pro-Russian separatists. For an English translation, see 
Minsk Agreement on Ukraine Crisis: Text in Full, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 12, 2015), http:// 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11408266/Minsk-agreement-on-
Ukraine-crisis-text-in-full.html. 
2. See Tom Cohen, Is Crimea Gone? Annexation No Longer the Focus of Ukraine Crisis, 
CNN (Apr. 1, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/31/politics/crimea-explainer/. 
3. See remarks by Dianne Feinstein in Brett Logiurato, Putin has Already Successfully 
Moved the Goalposts on Crimea, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www. busi-
nessinsider.com/crimea-putin-won-in-ukraine-obama-2014-3?IR=T. See also former Sec-
retary of Defense Robert Gates in John D. Stuster, Gates: Crimea is Already Gone, FOREIGN 
POLICY (Mar. 9, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/09/gates-crimea-is-already-
gone-updated/ (“I do not think that Crimea will slip out of Russia’s hand”); Elmar Brok, 
Die Krim Geht Nicht Zurück, ZEIT ONLINE (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.zeit.de/pol 
itik/ausland/2014-03/krim-ukraine-brok-jazenjuk. 
4. John J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 














politicians have accepted as much.5 What, if any, are the (legal) options to 
achieving this balancing act between the legally inconceivable and political-
ly possibly inevitable acceptance of Crimea’s altered status? Or is it all a 
question of endurance and determinedness and confidence that time will 
tell? Chancellor Angela Merkel in her speech at the Munich Security Con-
ference in February 2015 unwaveringly said, “Europe’s borders are and will 
remain unalterable.”6 Similarly, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council, meeting 
on November 17–18, 2014, reiterated that the EU condemns and will not 
recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol.7 And, indeed, 
State practice since 1945 shows that in the long run unlawful annexations 
are difficult to uphold and that a collective strategy of non-recognition is 
likely to pay off over time. As is well-known, Albania, Austria, the Baltic 
States, Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia were all resurrected as the same States 
that had existed prior to their annexation, which, ergo, had no enduring 
legal nor status-altering effect.8 The mills of international law grind slowly 
but they do grind.  
For the time being the international community and Western States in 
particular are committed to resisting any legal status alteration of Crimea 
with the same stamina and tenacity with which they resisted such altera-
tions in relation to the Baltic States during Soviet occupation. But there is 
at least one marked difference between the situation of the Baltic States 
and that of Crimea, which, in addition to Russia’s uncompromising strate-
gic interest in the peninsula, may lower the long-term prospects of a coor-
dinated non-recognition strategy. Unlike in the case of the Baltic States—
and notwithstanding the flaws of the referendum held on March 16, 
2014—at least for the time being the majority of the Crimean population 
appears genuinely to support Crimea’s “accession” to the Russian Federa-
tion.  
Against this backdrop, the present analysis considers the attempts to al-
ter Crimea’s territorial status in March 2014 and analyzes its resultant cur-
                                                                                                                      
5. See Cohen, supra note 2. 
6. Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, Speech on the Occasion of the 51st Munich Se-
curity Conference, (Feb. 7, 2015) (transcript available at http://www.bundesregierung. 
de/Content/EN/Reden/2015/2015-02-07-merkel-sicherheitskonferenz_en.html). 
7. Council Regulation 1351/2014, Amending Regulation (EU) No 692/2014 Con-
cerning Restrictive Measures in Response to the Illegal Annexation of Crimea and Sevas-
topol, 2014 O.J. (L 365) 46 (EU). 













rent status under international law, with a view to the possible future 
course of events.  
 
II.   CRIMEA’S STATUS AFTER UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE IN 1991 
 
The Crimea crisis of 2014 was only the latest escalation of intermittent 
post-Soviet tensions over the political status of Crimea and control of the 
Black Sea Fleet stationed at Sevastopol. In 1954 the Crimean oblast, until 
then part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, was trans-
ferred and incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic by de-
cree.9 In 1992, post Ukrainian independence, the Supreme Soviet of the 
Russian Federation tried to annul this decree.10 Moreover, the Supreme So-
viet of the Russian Federation cited “Russian federal status for the city of 
Sevastopol within the administrative and territorial borders of the city dis-
trict as of December 1991” and entrusted the Russian government with the 
task of working out a State program to ensure the status of Sevastopol.11 
Before the UN Security Council, the Ukrainian representative described the 
decree as “a time bomb.”12 In a presidential statement, the Security Council 
recalled that “in the Treaty between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, 
signed at Kiev on 19 November 1990, the High Contracting Parties com-
mitted themselves to respect each other’s territorial integrity within their 
currently existing frontiers” and that “[t]he Decree of the Supreme Soviet 
of the Russian Federation is incompatible with this commitment as well as 
with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and without effect.”13 On-
ly after lengthy negotiations was a compromise confirming the status quo 
finally reached in the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership 
                                                                                                                      
9. Angelika Nußberger, Russia, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW ¶ 43 (Oct. 2009). 
10. Serge Schmemann, Russia Votes to Void Cession of Crimea to Ukraine, NEW YORK 
TIMES, May 22, 1992, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/22/world/ 
russia-votes-to-void-cession-of-crimea-to-ukraine.html. 
11. Security Council, Letter dated July 16, 1993 from the Permanent Representative 
of Ukraine of the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/26100 (July 20, 1993). 
12. U.N. SCOR, 3256th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3256 (July 20, 1993). 
13. Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 













between Ukraine and the Russian Federation of May 31, 1997.14 Under Ar-
ticle 2, the two neighbors agreed to “respect each other’s territorial integri-
ty, and confirm the inviolability of the borders existing between them.”15  
 
 
III.   ATTEMPTS AT STATUS ALTERATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 
UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION OF 2014 
 
In the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution Russian and Crimean 
authorities quickly seized control over Crimea and installed the pro-Russian 
Aksyonov government. In a puzzlingly rapid and dense sequence of events, 
the Supreme National Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea de-
clared on March 11 that the Republic of Crimea would become independ-
ent in the case of a “Yes” vote in a subsequent referendum on independ-
ence;16 such a result was achieved on March 16.17 The Supreme Council of 
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea adopted, in an extraordinary session 
on March 17, a resolution “[o]n the independence of Crimea.”18 Russia’s 
formal recognition of Crimea as a sovereign and independent State as of 
March 17 followed,19 and a “treaty” of accession of the Republic of Crimea 
                                                                                                                      
14. Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the 
Russian Federation, Russ. Fed.-Ukr., May 31, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/52/174, Annex I (1997), 
available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/52/174. 
15. Id. 
16. Crimea Declares Independence and Seeks Accession to Russia, PRAVDA.RU (Mar. 17, 
2014), http://english.pravda.ru/news/russia/17-03-2014/127124-crimea_russia_independ 
ence-0/. 
17. Chris Morris, Crimea Referendum: Voters “Back Russia Union,” BBC (Mar. 16, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097. 
18. The Resolution states:  
 
The Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea, on the basis of direct 
will of the peoples of the Crimea expressed at the referendum of 16 March 2014, which 
showed that the people of the Crimea want to join Russia, and, consequently, separate 
from Ukraine and create an independent state, guided by the Declaration of Independence 
of the Republic of Crimea, adopted at an extraordinary plenary session of the Supreme 
Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea on March 11, 2014, and the extraordi-
nary plenary session of Sevastopol City Council on March 11, 2014, decides: to proclaim 
the Crimea an independent sovereign state - the Republic of the Crimea, in which the city 
of Sevastopol has a special status. 
 
Crimea Declares Independence and Seeks Accession to Russia, supra note 16. 
19. Executive Order on Recognizing Republic of Crimea, PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA (Mar. 17, 
2014), http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6884. The Executive Order reads in the relevant part: 












to the Russian Federation was signed on March 18, providing for the in-
corporation of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol as federal subjects 
of the Russian Federation.20  
According to the Russian narrative, the Republic of Crimea thereby be-
came an independent State and, by virtue of its immediate accession to and 
incorporation into the Russian Federation—something which President 
Putin in a far-fetched comparison has likened to German Reunification and 
the German Democratic Republic’s accession to the Federal Republic of 
Germany21—now exists only as a federal entity of the Russian Federation 
and not as a subject of international law in its own right.22 In the treaty of 
accession signed by the Russian and Crimean governments on March 18, 
2014, the status of the peninsula—formerly an “autonomous republic” of 
Ukraine—was changed to that of a “republic,”23 with Crimea joining the 
twenty-one other “republics” of the Russian Federation and the city of Se-
vastopol added to the now eighty-five “federal subjects.”  
However, the UN General Assembly, in Resolution 68/262 adopted on 
March 27, 2014—with one hundred States voting in favor, eleven against, 
fifty-eight abstentions and twenty-four absentees24—underscored that “the 
                                                                                                                      
March 16, 2014, the Russian Federation is to recognize the Republic of Crimea as a sover-
eign and independent state, whose city of Sevastopol has a special status.” 
20. Ukraine Crisis: Putin Signs Russian-Crimea Treaty, BBC (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26630062. For the full text in Russian, see 
Договор между Российской Федерацией и Республикой Крым о Принятии в Российскую Федерацию 
Республики Крым и Образовании в Составе Российской Федерации Новых Субъектов, 
ПРЕЗИДЕНТ РОССИИ (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.kremlin.ru/news/20605. For a “rough 
translation,” see Gregory H. Fox, Guest Post: The Russia-Crimea Treaty, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 
20, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/20/guest-post-russia-crimea-treaty/. 
21. President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, Address at the Kremlin (Mar. 
18, 2014) (transcript available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889) [hereinafter Kremlin 
Address] (“I am confident that you have not forgotten this, and I expect that the citizens 
of Germany will also support the aspiration of the Russians, of historical Russia, to restore 
unity.”). With regard to the accepted legal consequences of German reunification, see Let-
ter from the German Foreign Minister to the United Nations Secretary-General, Federal 
Republic of Germany-German Democratic Republic: Treaty on the Establishment of 
German Unity (Oct. 3, 1990), 30 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 457 (1991).  
22. Kremlin Address, supra note 21. 
23. Mark Kramer, Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?, WILSON CEN-
TER, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-yea 
rs-ago (last visited Mar. 26, 2015). 
24. Ryan Goodman, How “Overwhelming” was the UN General Assembly Vote on Crimea?, 














referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of 
Sevastopol on 16 March 2014, having no validity, cannot form the basis for 
any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or of 
the city of Sevastopol” and called 
 
upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to 
recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on the basis of the above-mentioned 
referendum and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be inter-
preted as recognizing any such altered status.25 
 
IV.   CRIMEA’S STATUS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Under international law the purported status alteration of Crimea was un-
successful, i.e., Crimea remains de jure part of Ukraine. This is so because 
even if there had been a legal basis for a territorial status alteration of Cri-
mea, the fact that it was brought about by, and is inseparably linked to, an 
unlawful use of force renders it null and void.26 Without Russia’s involve-
ment, Crimea’s quest for independence and accession to Russia may have 
remained forever ineffective; because of Russia’s unlawful involvement it 
will remain forever legally tainted. 
 
A. Russia’s Unlawful Intervention 
 
Controversy about certain facts remains, but it is by now—particularly 
considering that President Putin himself has meanwhile publicly admitted 
as much27—beyond any doubt that Russia forcibly intervened in Crimea in 
the spring of 2014.28 Russia’s attempts to justify its use of force on the basis 
                                                                                                                      
25. G.A. Res. 68/262, ¶¶ 5–6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/262 (Mar. 27, 2014). 
26. Reiner Hofmann, Annexation, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, ¶ 28 (Feb. 2013). 
27. Putin Acknowledges Russian Military Serviceman were in Crimea, RT (Apr. 17, 2014), 
http://rt.com/news/crimea-defense-russian-soldiers-108/ (“‘Crimean self-defense forces were of 
course backed by Russian servicemen,’ Putin said. ‘They acted very appropriately, but as I’ve already said 
decisively and professionally.’”) (emphasis in original). See also Peter Maxwill, Putin Über Einsatz 
in der Ukraine: “Schwere Maschinengewehre, Nicht Viel Reden,” SPIEGEL ONLINE (Mar. 9, 2015), 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/ukraine-putin-ueber-krim-annexion-und-janukow 
ytsch-flucht-a-1022466.html. 
28. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs William Hague, Oral 
Statement to Parliament on the UK’s Response to the Situation in Ukraine (Mar. 4, 2014), 












of the alleged protection of Russian nationals and an invitation issued by 
the former Ukrainian government have already been dealt with and plausi-
bly rejected elsewhere. For the purposes of the present article they need 
not be revisited.29 Leaving aside the violations of the so-called Budapest 
Memorandum of 199430 and the above-mentioned bilateral Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Rus-
sian Federation of 1997, Russia’s use of force in spring 2014 was unlawful 
and the violation of the Black Sea Fleet stationing agreements in the run up 
to the referendum was a paradigmatic example of aggression.31  
 
B. The Inseparability of the Link between Russia’s Unlawful Use of Force and the 
Purported Territorial Status Alteration of Crimea 
 
More important for the purposes of the present article is the fact that this 
unlawful use of force is inseparably connected to the purported subsequent 
status alteration of Crimea. Whereas under classical international law con-
quest and annexation were still regarded as valid derivative titles of territo-
rial acquisition,32 it is beyond any doubt that under modern international 
                                                                                                                      
situation-in-ukraine) (“Russian forces in Crimea went on to take control of Ukrainian mili-
tary sites, including in Belbek, Balaclava and Kerch, and to establish full operational con-
trol in the Crimea.”). 
29. See Christian Marxsen, The Crimea Crisis—An International Law Perspective, 74 HEI-
DELBERG JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 367, 372–74 (2014). See also Daniel 
Wisehart, The Crisis in Ukraine and the Prohibition of the Use of Force: A Legal Basis for Russia’s 
Intervention?, EJIL: TALK (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-crisis-in-ukraine-and-
the-prohibition-of-the-use-of-force-a-legal-basis-for-russias-intervention/. 
30. Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Letter dated Dec. 7, 1994 from 
the Permanent Representatives of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United 
Nations to the Secretary-General, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/49/765, S/1994/1399 (Dec. 19, 
1994). 
31. See Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) art. 3(e), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3314(XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974). 
32. Conquest as defined in Legal Status of Eastern Greenland is a derivative title of acqui-
sition of territorial sovereignty: “a cause of loss of sovereignty when there is war between 
two States and by reason of the defeat of one of them sovereignty over territory passes 
from the loser to the victorious State.” Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 














law forcible acquisitions of territory are prohibited.33 Even in cases where 
the self-defense provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter apply, forcible 
status alterations cannot be justified.34 In such instances, upholding the 
prohibition of the use of force is considered sufficiently important that it 
outweighs the principle of effectiveness.35  
Even under classical international law—the typical examples cited in 
this context are the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1908 and the Italian annexation of Ethiopia in 1936, nei-
ther of which was recognized by the major powers of the time36—it was 
doubtful whether a victorious State could unilaterally acquire sovereignty 
over enemy territory simply by virtue of annexation, i.e., merely through 
factual seizure of the territory in question.37 And while it remains debatable 
at which exact point in time prior to World War II the prohibition of an-
nexation of territory through force materialized (especially as a matter of 
customary international law), today, in light of Article 2(4) of the UN Char-
ter and Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT),38 it is beyond any doubt that forcible acquisitions of territory, 
whether treaty-based or not, are illegal and without effect under interna-
tional law.39 Since the adoption of the UN Charter this position has been 
reconfirmed time and again, inter alia, in the Friendly Relations Declaration 
of 1970, stipulating that “[t]he territory of a State shall not be the object of 
                                                                                                                      
33. As Judge Philip Jessup pointed out in his dissenting opinion in South West Africa 
Cases (Second Phase) in 1966, “[i]t is a commonplace that international law does not recog-
nize military conquest as a source of title.” South West Africa Cases (Second Phase) (Eth. 
v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 418 (July 18) (Jessup, J. dissenting). 
34. Marcelo G. Kohen, Conquest, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, ¶ 12 (June 2009). 
35. CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 140; Hofmann, supra note 26; Kohen, supra note 34, ¶ 
12. 
36. Kohen, supra note 34, ¶ 8. See also James W. Garner, Editorial Comment, Non-
Recognition of Illegal Territorial Annexations and Claims to Sovereignty, 30 AMERICAN JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 679 (1936). 
37. Hence, conquest in contradistinction to annexation was understood to require the 
fulfillment of additional conditions, namely the conclusion of a peace treaty, which in turn 
led some authors to doubt whether conquest as such was distinct from cession and there-
fore whether it constituted a distinct title of acquisition at all. See Kohen, supra note 34. 
38. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 52, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. According to Article 52 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, “[a] treaty is 
void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the 
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.” 












acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force,”40 as 
well as in the 1974 General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the def-
inition of aggression.41 Similarly, the Security Council has repeatedly em-
phasized the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.”42 In the 
case of Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait, Resolution 662 (1990) unanimously 
declared the annexation to be null and void and called upon States and in-
stitutions not to recognize the annexation and to refrain from any action 
that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of it.43 Similarly, with 
respect to the annexation of the Golan Heights by Israel, the Security 
Council decided in Resolution 497 (1981) that the “Israeli decision to im-
pose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan 
Heights is null and void and without international legal effect.”44 
Under modern international law, what distinguishes prohibited annexa-
tion that must not be recognized under any circumstances,45 from other 
attempts at status alteration that may or may not be recognized by other 
States,46 is the nexus of the attempted status alteration to a prior unlawful 
                                                                                                                      
40. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. 
Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/8082 (Oct. 
24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration]. 
41. Article 5(3) G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) declares that “[n]o territorial acquisition or 
special advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful.” Definition 
of Aggression, supra note 31. 
42. S.C. Res. 242, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967). See also S.C. Res. 859, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/859 (Aug. 24, 1993); S.C. Res. 874, U.N. Doc. S/RES/874 (Oct. 14, 1993); 
S.C Res. 896, U.N. Doc. S/RES/896 (Jan. 31, 1994). 
43. S.C. Res. 662, U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (Aug. 9, 1990).  
44. S.C. Res. 497, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/497 (Dec. 17, 1981). A similar view was tak-
en by the General Assembly in its Resolution on the situation in the occupied Arab terri-
tories. G.A. Res. ES-9/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-9/1 (Feb. 5, 1982). 
45. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 
41, Report of the International Law Commission, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 
10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 
YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 32, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2). 
46. According to the Supreme Court of Canada:  
 
Although there is no right, under the Constitution or at international law, to unilateral 
secession . . . this does not rule out the possibility of an unconstitutional declaration of 
secession leading to a de facto secession. The ultimate success of such a secession would 
be dependent on recognition by the international community, which is likely to consider 
the legality and legitimacy of secession having regard to, amongst other facts, the conduct 













use of force. As the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Kosovo advisory 
opinion implies,47 if there is such a nexus even a declaration of independ-
ence—which according to the ICJ would not otherwise be considered to 
violate international law—may breach international law. Thus, the ICJ held 
that: 
 
[T]he illegality attached to [some other] declarations of independence . . . 
stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, 
but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the 
unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general 
international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus co-
gens).48 
 
It must be conceded that in some circumstances it may not be fully clear 
whether there is such a connection, whether it can and has been validly in-
terrupted by subsequent events and what exactly are the current criteria for 
the determination of such a nexus or a valid disruption thereof. A structur-
ally similar problem arises with regard to Article 52 VCLT and the deter-
mination whether the conclusion of a treaty “has been procured by the [il-
legal] threat or use of force.”49 
Clearly, mere passage of time cannot “heal” the unlawfulness of a terri-
torial status alteration effected by force.50 On the other hand it is clear that 
just because a territory has at some point in the past been the victim of an 
unlawful use of force, this does not automatically bar all future attempts at 
territorial status alteration. Thus, with the uninfluenced, free consent of the 
parent State, a territorial status alteration, disconnected from a preceding 
unlawful use of force, could be effected. In this case the status alteration 
                                                                                                                      
recognition, even if granted, would not, however, provide any retroactive justification for 
the act of secession, either under the Constitution of Canada or at international law. 
 
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 155 (Can.). 
47. Jure Vidmar, Crimea’s Referendum and Secession: Why it Resembles Northern Cyprus More 
than Kosovo, EJIL: TALK (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimeas-referendum-and-
secession-why-it-resembles-northern-cyprus-more-than-kosovo/. 
48. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 81 (July 22) (emphasis added). 
49. 2 THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 
1211–13 (Oliver Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011). 
50. See Thomas D. Grant, Crimea After Cyprus v. Turkey: Just Satisfaction for Unlawful 
Annexation?, EJIL: TALK (May 19, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimea-after-cyprus-v-
turkey-just-satisfaction-for-unlawful-annexation/; Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Rus-












would no longer be based on the use of force but on the free-will decision 
of the relevant right-holder. The challenge in such situations is a factual 
one, i.e., establishing that indeed a free-will decision, uninfluenced by the 
preceding use of force or continuing threats resulting therefrom, has been 
taken. Thus, hypothetically, if Ukraine at some point in the future freely 
decided to cede the territory of Crimea to the Russian Federation, a valid 
territorial status alteration could be effected. However, in light of the cir-
cumstances currently prevailing on the ground and explicit statements from 
the Ukrainian government calling for Crimea’s “return” to Ukraine,51 such 
a decision, uninfluenced by coercion, seems farfetched and unrealistic. 
But leaving aside this hypothetical clear-cut scenario, in practice it may 
be more difficult to establish whether the connection between an unlawful 
use of force and a subsequent status alteration has been disrupted. In the 
case of Kosovo the ICJ’s advisory opinion assumed, at least implicitly, that 
in spite of NATO’s unlawful use of force in 1999, Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence in 2008 was no longer linked to the events of 1999.52 The 
ICJ did not specify nor provide an explicit explanation as to how exactly 
the connection had been disrupted. In the absence of any plausible alterna-
tive, it must have been the Chapter VII-based Security Council Resolution 
1244 (1999), which subsequent to NATO’s forcible intervention with the 
agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and by a vote of fourteen 
to none (and an abstention by China), authorized the presence of interna-
tional forces in Kosovo.53 While it remains controversial whether Kosovo 
had indeed a “right” to secede based on the controversial doctrine of re-
                                                                                                                      
51. Poroschenko Gibt Krim Nicht Verloren, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (Feb. 23, 2015), 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/europa/petro-poroschenko-gibt-ukraine-
halbinsel-krim-nicht-verloren-13444789.html. 
52. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, supra note 48, ¶ 81. Otherwise, on the basis of 
its own explicit reasoning in paragraph 81, the Court would have had to find Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence in violation of international law. 
53. The Security Council: 
 
Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international 
civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and 
welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences; 
. . .  
 
Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the inter-
national security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary 
means to fulfill its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below. 
 













medial secession,54 it follows that because of the interrupted connection 
between NATO’s unlawful use of force in 1999 and Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence in 2008, States are free either to recognize Kosovo as an 
independent State or to withhold recognition.55 After all, international law 
treats differently a situation in which an entity attempts to secede without 
having a right to do so from a situation in which such an attempt is backed 
by an unlawful use of force. In the former case international law remains 
neutral. As Crawford points out, “the position is that secession is neither 
legal nor illegal in international law, but a legally neutral act the conse-
quences of which are regulated internationally.”56 Conversely, in the latter 
case, i.e., if there is a connection to an unlawful use of force, any legal ef-
fects are rendered null and void from the outset and recognition is prohib-
ited.  
 
C. Remedial Secession or Restoration of Historic Rights? 
 
Obviously, the case of Crimea differs from the example of Kosovo be-
cause—among other things—nothing remotely similar to the adoption of 
Resolution 1244 occurred. There are thus only two possible—albeit in this 
case utterly unconvincing—ways to argue that Crimea’s purported status 
alteration in 2014 was not, or was no longer, linked to the preceding unlaw-
ful use of force.  
First, it has been argued that Crimea actually had a right to secede 
based on remedial secession and that Russia’s forcible intervention, intend-
ing to support this allegedly legitimate secession, was therefore lawful. On 
this basis it could—as a variant of the above-mentioned justifications in-
voked by Russia—hypothetically be argued that Russia’s use of force, be-
cause it supported a remedial secession, was lawful. Alternatively, and irre-
spective of the legal qualification of Russia’s use of force, the subsequent 
status alteration could potentially be depicted as having been based on a 
                                                                                                                      
54. In the case of Kosovo, in addition to the general controversy surrounding the no-
tion of remedial secession, it could be questioned whether the events that disrupted the 
link between the unlawful use of force in 1999 and the declaration of independence in 
2008 did not also disrupt the connection between the large-scale human rights violations 
that triggered the right to remedial secession and the situation of Kosovo in 2008. 
55. The Republic of Kosovo has stated that it is recognized by 108 countries. U.N. 
SCOR, 69th Sess., 7257th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7257 (Aug, 29, 2014). 












separate, valid ground for secession, arguing that it was therefore sufficient-
ly disconnected from the preceding use of force.  
Secondly, Russian officials have depicted events in Crimea as a restora-
tion of Russia’s historic rights.57 Thus, in his speech of March 2014 Vladi-
mir Putin stated that “[i]n People’s hearts and minds, Crimea has always 
been an inseparable part of Russia.”58 Admittedly, the exact line of argu-
ment is difficult to decipher. But it seems that in as far as this is a legal ar-
gument, it is meant to imply that, because of some unspecified irremediable 
defects regarding Crimea’s transfer to Ukraine in 1954, Crimea actually 
never validly became part of Ukraine in the first place.  
 
1. Crimea’s “Secession” as a Case of Remedial Secession? 
 
The year 2014 saw in Scotland a prominent—albeit unsuccessful—attempt 
at secession through plebiscite. Apart from its unsuccessfulness,59 this at-
tempt had nothing in common with Crimea’s purported secession.60 To the 
                                                                                                                      
57. See Anton Moiseienko, What Do Russian Lawyers Say About Crimea?, OPINIO JURIS 
(Sept. 24, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/24/guest-post-russian-lawyers-say-crim 
ea/. 
58. Kremlin Address, supra note 21; John Cassidy, Putin’s Crimean History Lesson, THE 
NEW YORKER (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/putins-
crimean-history-lesson. 
59. The Scottish referendum for independence was voted down; a Spanish court 
banned the holding of a referendum in Catalonia. See Scottish Referendum: Scotland Votes 
“No” to Independence, BBC (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-
29270441; S.T.C., Apr. 10, 2014 (B.O.E., No. 87, p. 66) (Spain), available at http://www. 
tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/Paginas/Sentencia.aspx?cod=20993. 
60. Coincidentally, both referenda had the potential for far-reaching nuclear implica-
tions. The Scottish referendum in case of success would have rendered a blow to the Brit-
ish nuclear program, given that the British nuclear submarine fleet is located at Faslane, 
Scotland, with no obvious alternative location elsewhere. Conversely, in the case of 
Ukraine and in light of Russia’s breach of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 there were 
initially significant concerns that Ukraine might opt to leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and resume its nuclear program. The G7 therefore were relieved by Ukraine’s statement at 
the 2014 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee where Ukraine declared that it 
remains committed to the provisions of the Treaty: 
  
We deplore the recent and ongoing breaches of the commitments given to Ukraine by the 
Russian Federation in the Budapest Memorandum. In this Memorandum, the Russian 
Federation, United Kingdom and the United States reaffirmed their commitment to re-
spect Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty and existing borders; reaffirmed their obli-
gation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of Ukraine and that none of their weapons will ever be used against 













contrary, they differed on almost every account. On September 18 Scotland 
held a referendum on Scottish independence and secession from the Unit-
ed Kingdom. On March 16 a referendum was held on the status of Cri-
mea.61 But whereas the Scottish referendum was carried out comme-il-faut 
and, most importantly from the perspective of international law, with the 
consent of the mother State,62 the Crimean referendum—albeit successful 
on paper—had significant procedural flaws and was undertaken against the 
clear and explicit will of Ukraine.  
As a general rule, outside the colonial context international law does 
not grant a right to secession.63 Leaving aside consensual secessions as in 
the case of South Sudan or Montenegro, self-determination is to be 
achieved from within, i.e., through participation in a State’s political sys-
tem.64 Whether international law can, in extreme cases, grant an exceptional 
right to secession remains highly controversial.65 In the Aaland Islands case 
the International Committee of Jurists left the door open for such a right 
of remedial secession, stating that absent “a manifest and continued abuse 
of sovereign power to the detriment of a section of population” there was 
                                                                                                                      
Nations, and reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine to refrain from economic coercion. 
We consider that Ukraine’s historic decisions in 1994 were significant steps in promoting 
its own and wider regional and international security. We also welcome Ukraine’s state-
ment at the 2014 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee that Ukraine remains 
committed to the provisions of the NPT. 
 
G-7 Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament for 2014, ¶ 6, IHP DIGITAL (June 5, 
2014), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/06/20140610301019.ht 
ml#ixzz3OuZcIHT3. 
61. See Noah Sneider, 2 Choices in Crimea Referendum, but Neither is “No,” NEW YORK 
TIMES (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/15/world/europe/crimea-
vote-does-not-offer-choice-of-status-quo.html?_r=0. 
62. Yves Beigbeder, Referendum, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, ¶ 46–50 (June 2011). 
63. As stated by the Commission of Jurists appointed by the League of Nations to ex-
amine the Aaland Islands situation, “Positive international law does not recognize the right 
of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of which they form a 
part by the simple expression of a wish.” Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrust-
ed by the Council of the League of Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion Upon the 
Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations O.J. Spec. Supp. 3, at 3 (1920) 
[hereinafter Aaland Islands Question Report]. See also id. at 5–10. 
64. CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 417. 
65. See Jure Vidmar, Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice, 6 
ST ANTONY’S INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 37 (2010); Peter Hilpold, The Kosovo Case and In-
ternational Law: Looking for Applicable Theories, 8 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 












no right to secede.66 The Supreme Court of Canada was even more explicit, 
holding that “[a] right to external self-determination arises only in the most 
extreme cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.”67 
Notably, Russia—wary of Chechnya’s quest for independence and for a 
long time adamantly opposed to the concept of remedial secession—in the 
course of the Kosovo proceedings submitted a written statement according 
to which the so-called “safeguard clause” “may be construed as authorizing 
secession under certain conditions.”68 The statement went on to specify 
that 
 
those conditions should be limited to truly extreme circumstances, such 
as an outright armed attack by the parent State, threatening the very exist-
ence of the people in question. Otherwise, all efforts should be taken in 
order to settle the tension between the parent State and the ethnic com-
munity concerned within the framework of the existing State.69  
 
Indeed, still more proponents of a right to remedial secession agree 
that the threshold for such a right—which compromises a State’s territorial 
integrity—is very high.70 Thus, even conceding that in the case of Crimea 
some facts remain controversial, it is clear that this threshold was not met.71 
As has been pointed out elsewhere, in light of the multi-ethnic composition 
of the people of Crimea it is already doubtful whether a holder of the col-
                                                                                                                      
66. Aaland Islands Question Report, supra note 63, at 5–10. 
67. Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 46, ¶ 123. 
68. Written Statement of the Russian Federation, Accordance with International Law 
of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion 
(Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15628.pdf.  
The so-called “safeguard-clause” can be found in the Friendly Relations Declaration 
in the rubric dealing with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, it 
reads: 
 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or po-
litical unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance 
with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above 
and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the terri-
tory without distinction as to race, creed or colour. 
 
Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 40. 
69. Written Statement of the Russian Federation, supra note 68, ¶ 88.  
70. On the discussion, see Chris Borgen, Can Crimea Secede by Referendum?, OPINIO JU-














lective right to self-determination exists.72 But even if that was the case, it is 
clear that the main and most widely agreed upon criteria for a right to re-
medial secession, namely the existence of egregious, widespread violations 
of human rights and a persistent denial of any relevant internal self-
determination, were not met.73 As noted previously, Crimea had been given 
the status of an “autonomous republic” within Ukraine.74 And even though 
the implementation of regional autonomy may not have been perfect, it 
was nowhere near a persistent denial of internal self-determination. Similar-
ly, while breaches of human rights have clearly occurred in Crimea, there 
simply is no evidence of widespread and egregious human rights viola-
tions.75 Finally, neither the hypothetical future human rights violations in-
voked by Russia as a justification for its “humanitarian intervention” nor 
the mere holding of a referendum suffice to compensate for the lack of the 
central criteria for a remedial secession. Thus, it cannot be argued either 
that Russia’s use of force was justified because it supported “the Crimeans” 
in their rightful quest to secede, or that the referendum gave expression to 
a self-standing right of remedial secession, such as to disrupt the link be-
tween the preceding unlawful use of force and Crimea’s status alteration. 
 
2. The Takeover of Crimea as a Restoration of Russia’s “Historic Rights”? 
 
Russia’s invocation of ostensible historic rights over Crimea is not new and 
is reminiscent, at least to some extent, of China’s reasoning vis-à-vis Ti-
bet.76 As mentioned above, throughout the 1990s Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation repeatedly clashed over the status of Crimea and Sevastopol. In 
1954 the transfer of Crimea from the Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist 
Republics to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UKrSS), by a decree 
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on February 19, 1954, 
was officially explained (only) by reference to the commemoration of the 
                                                                                                                      
72. See Anne Peters, Crimea: Does “The West” Now Pay the Price for Kosovo?, EJIL: TALK 
(Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimea-does-the-west-now-pay-the-price-for-kos 
ovo/. 
73. With respect to additional (procedural) criteria typically required for a remedial se-
cession to become effective, see id. 
74. ROMAN SOLCHANYK, UKRAINE AND RUSSIA: THE POST-SOVIET TRANSITION, 
162–66 (2001). 
75. Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/75 (Sept. 19, 
2014).  












300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav and the “territorial proximity 
of Crimea to Ukraine, the commonalities of their economies and close ag-
ricultural and cultural ties between the Crimean oblast and the UKrSS.”77 
Discussion over the “true” reasons for Crimea’s transfer continues to 
date.78  
Putin in his March 18, 2014 speech said that: 
 
What matters now is that this decision was made in clear violation of the 
constitutional norms that were in place even then. The decision was made 
behind the scenes. Naturally, in a totalitarian state nobody bothered to 
ask the citizens of Crimea and Sevastopol. They were faced with the fact. 
People, of course, wondered why all of a sudden Crimea became part of 
Ukraine. But on the whole—and we must state this clearly, we all know 
it—this decision was treated as a formality of sorts because the territory 
was transferred within the boundaries of a single state. Back then, it was 
impossible to imagine that Ukraine and Russia may split up and become 
two separate states. However, this has happened.79 
 
Thus, Crimea’s 1954 transfer to Ukraine is depicted as an erratic act of 
then-Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev who ordered the transfer in vio-
lation of the constitution, absent any consultation with the people, and 
who allegedly operated under the presumption of the continuing (everlast-
ing?) unity of the USSR as a single State. Whether the transfer was indeed 
unconstitutional remains controversial.80 But even if it were, this would be 
without any effect on the international level.81 Similarly, assuming that 
Khrushchev acted under the assumption of continuing unity of the USSR, 
this still would not alter the legal assessment. Because even if the USSR’s 
dissolution in 1991 could, by way of analogy, be compared to an unex-
pected, fundamental change of circumstances in the sense of Article 62 of 
the VCLT, Article 62(2)(a) provides that a fundamental change of circum-
stances may not be invoked to alter a State’s treaty obligations where State 
boundaries are concerned.82 In such a case, stability in international rela-
tions takes precedence over the protection of other legitimate motives and 
                                                                                                                      
77. Kramer, supra note 23. 
78. Id. 
79. Kremlin Address, supra note 21. 
80. Kramer, supra note 23. 
81. See generally ANDREAS VON ARNAULD, VÖLKERRECHT ¶ 235 (2d ed. 2014).  
82. 2 THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, su-













interests. This reasoning holds true irrespective of whether State bounda-
ries were established by virtue of a treaty or unilaterally by decree. Moreo-
ver, post-Soviet practice—apart from the 1992 attempt to annul the 1954 
decree—clearly confirms that Crimea belongs to Ukraine. After the disso-
lution of the USSR, the uti possidetis doctrine was applied between the Rus-
sian Federation and Ukraine as is confirmed, inter alia, by the 1997 Treaty 
of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Rus-
sian Federation, in which the parties agreed to “respect each other’s territo-
rial integrity, and confirm the inviolability of the borders between them.”83  
 
D. Crimea’s Current Status as an Occupied Territory 
 
Whereas the purported annexation of Crimea has not brought about a ter-
ritorial status alteration under international law, it has led to a situation of 
occupation that continues to date and that may endure for many years to 
come. Northern Cyprus has been occupied since 1974 in spite of its pro-
claimed independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 
1983.84 As is well known, Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations pro-
vides that “[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed un-
der the authority of the hostile army.”85 Since the Russian Federation con-
siders Crimea to form part of its own (sovereign) territory, it is a fortiori ex-
ercising direct, effective control over the territory in question and hence 
qualifies as the occupier of Crimea.  
The assessment as to precisely when, prior to Crimea’s purported ac-
cession to the Russian Federation, this part of Ukraine’s territory began to 
                                                                                                                      
83. Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the 
Russian Federation, supra note 14, art. 2; Nußberger, supra note 9, ¶ 43; Treaty on Friend-
ship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Repub-
lic-Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Nov. 19, 1990, 1641 U.N.T.S. 219; Giuseppe Nesi, 
Uti Possidetis Doctrine, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
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lics. Malcolm N. Shaw, The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today, 67 
BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (1996). 
84. The U.N. General Assembly declared that “part of the territory of the Republic of 
Cyprus is still occupied by foreign forces.” G.A. Res. 37/253, pmbl., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/37/253 (May 13, 1983). 
85. Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539. See generally Tristan Ferraro, Determining the Beginning and 
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be occupied is more intricate and ultimately hinges on the facts on the 
ground. Leaving aside the discussion of whether, in addition to Article 42 
of the Hague Regulations, a different legal basis for the determination of 
the existence of a state of occupation exists,86 it is clear that as events were 
unfolding in March 2014 the central Ukrainian government in Kiev was no 
longer capable of exercising its authority in Crimea. The difficult question 
is whether and, if so, how Russia was exercising effective control over Cri-
mea during the initial period. In this regard it could be argued that Russia 
exercised direct and effective control, or at least had potential control, over 
Crimea given that at all times it had the possibility to send in more troops 
within reasonable time.87 Alternatively it could be argued that Russia exer-
cised indirect effective control in the sense that it had overall control over 
local authorities that exercised effective control over Crimea (“occupation 
by proxy”). The ICJ in the Armed Activities case endorsed the possibility of 
such an occupation by proxy.88 But without going into the details of these 
different options—especially with hindsight and in light of President 
Putin’s increasingly straightforward public acknowledgments of Russian 
involvement in the events on the ground—it seems that a strong case can 
be made for the most straightforward option, namely that Russia itself was 
exercising direct, effective control over Crimea prior to the referendum in 
March 2014. In terms of the quality of control required, there is, of course, 
no mathematical benchmark to determine how much control is needed to 
qualify as “effective control” in the sense of Article 42 of the Hague Regu-
lations.89 The determination whether there is “effective control” is circum-
stantial. Thus, as the U.S. Army’s Field Manual, the Law of Land Warfare, 
confirms, “[t]he number of troops necessary to maintain effective occupation will 
depend on various considerations such as the disposition of the inhabit-
ants, the number and density of the population, the nature of the terrain, 
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and similar factors.”90 In the present case and given that in any case “effec-
tive control” does not mean full or total control over every square inch of 
territory, it could be argued that once the terms of the stationing agreement 
were no longer abided by, the presence of over twenty-five thousand sol-
diers in a strategic position in the small territory of Crimea sufficed for 
Russia to directly exercise “effective control.” The fact that the Russian 
military presence on the territory of Ukraine did not meet with any armed 
resistance is irrelevant.91 It was clearly coercive in the sense that it was an 
unconsented to military presence. Obviously, consent from regional au-
thorities and/or the local population of the region in question or the oust-
ed Yanukovych government that had lost effective control is immaterial. 
What matters is the consent from the central government in Kiev.  
Notably, in the particular case of Crimea, labeling the situation as one 
of occupation may be more important than actually rendering applicable 
substantive provisions of the law of occupation. After all, the label “occu-
pation” denotes that there has not been any legal status alteration. This is 
not to say that the protective regime of the law of occupation, for example 
the prohibition of discrimination laid out in Article 27 of the Fourth Gene-
va Convention (GC IV), does not matter in the case of Crimea.92 To the 
contrary, especially the Crimean Tartars and those opposing the Russian 
presence in Crimea are at risk of significant human rights abuses.93 In this 
regard the application of the law of occupation—alongside Russia’s human 
rights obligations94—is highly significant and remains unaffected by the fact 
that Russia does not consider Crimea to qualify as occupied territory.95 
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92.  Id., art. 27. 
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(2015), available at https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/CrimeaReport_FINAL. 
pdf. 
94. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9). 
95. The ICRC Commentary emphasizes the general rule that “an Occupying Power 
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These protections—according to Article 3(b) of Additional Protocol I96 (to 
which both the Russian Federation and Ukraine are parties)—will remain 
in place until the occupation is terminated.97 
Russia does not act as a hostile occupier vis-à-vis the majority of Cri-
means, who seem to be genuinely welcoming the Russian presence, but 
rather as an unusually benign occupier. The legal regime on occupation is 
hybrid, i.e., it entails two dimensions of legal consequences. On the one 
hand, it grants important protections on the individual level for those per-
sons who are subject to the authority of a foreign (hostile) occupier. On 
the other hand, it has implications on the inter-State level in that it signifies 
there has not been any change in or transfer of territorial sovereignty, and 
that the situation is temporary and exceptional.98 To this end, the legal re-
gime of occupation contains a number of safeguards that prevent the oc-
cupier from consolidating the situation and from introducing overly far-
reaching changes into the institutions and State structure of the occupied 
territory. Article 43 Hague Regulations and Article 47 GC IV both attest to 
                                                                                                                      
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in 
any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change intro-
duced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of 
the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied 
territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or 
part of the occupied territory. 
 
GC IV, supra note 91, art. 47. See also On the Legal Regime of the Temporary Occupied Territory of 
Crimea, EMBASSY OF UKRAINE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
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this dual character of occupation. An occupying authority is merely to be 
considered as a temporary, de facto administrator.  
 
V.   LEGAL CONSEQUENCES AND LEGAL OPTIONS FOR THE WAY AHEAD 
 
Whether territorial changes are successful or unsuccessful typically depends 
on their recognition. State practice since 1945 shows that—with the excep-
tion of the unique case of Bangladesh—a territorial status alteration against 
the will of the parent State is unlikely to succeed.99 Secessionist entities 
such as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Transnistria, Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh have existed for relatively long peri-
ods of time, but have only received a very limited number of recognitions 
from other States.100  
In the case of Crimea, however, because of the way in which the status 
alteration was brought about, namely by virtue of Russia’s unlawful use of 
force, the issue of recognition does not even arise. In order to avoid any 
consolidation of such an unlawful status alteration, any recognition there-
of—explicit or implicit—must be prevented. Significant inconsistencies 
regarding the practice of recognition notwithstanding, the principle of non-
recognition as spelled out in Article 41(2) of the ILC Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility remains valid and is widely accepted. Since the formu-
lation of the so-called Stimson Doctrine in the course of the Manchurian 
crisis of 1931–32, it has been reconfirmed on numerous occasions,101 inter 
alia, in the Friendly Relations Declaration, as well as in relevant Security 
Council resolutions adopted in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 
1990,102 Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights103 and the proclamation 
of the Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983.104 
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Of course, due to Crimea’s and Sevastopol’s swift “incorporation” into 
the Russian Federation, Crimea is factually not as dependent on recogni-
tion as a self-standing entity like Kosovo. But nonetheless, legally speaking, 
recognition of Crimea’s purported short-time independence and its subse-
quent “incorporation” into the Russian Federation must be withheld. As 
the commentary on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility clarifies, 
“[t]he obligation applies to ‘situations’ created by these breaches.”105 The 
UN General Assembly has therefore called upon 
 
all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to rec-
ognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
and the city of Sevastopol on the basis of the above-mentioned referendum 
and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as rec-
ognizing any such altered status.106  
 
Indeed, in case of violation of a peremptory norm of international law—in 
this case Article 2(4) of the UN Charter—Article 41 ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility stipulates a duty of abstention.107 This duty of abstention— 
because it concerns the international community as a whole—extends even 
to Ukraine itself, which is therefore barred from retroactively recognizing 
or acquiescing in Crimea’s status alteration.108 Similarly, Russia’s recogni-
tion of the independent Republic of Crimea amounted to a violation of 
international law. Collective non-recognition is a form of soft-sanction and 
as Lauterpacht wrote, “the minimum of resistance which an insufficiently 
organized but law-abiding community offers to illegality; it is a continuous 
challenge to a legal wrong.”109 In addition, Article 41(1) stipulates a positive 
obligation to cooperate to bring to an end a situation resulting from a seri-
ous breach of a peremptory norm of international law. This is an obligation 
of conduct and as such it is to be fulfilled by exercising due diligence. Its 
precise content depends on the circumstances of each specific case and it 
allows States to take into consideration a broad range of considerations. 
For the time being, Western States have responded with increasingly severe 
economic sanctions.110 But Western leaders currently remain divided over 
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the question whether arming Ukraine’s forces is a must or a no-go.111 And 
while in this author’s view there are good reasons to consider arms deliver-
ies a no-go, explicitly excluding them and thereby limiting one’s options 
from the outset seems unwise. 
All of this does not mean that the injured State, i.e., Ukraine could nev-
er consent to a territorial status alteration of the territory in question. How-
ever, as the wording of General Assembly Resolution 68/262, which calls 
upon calls upon States not to recognize “any alteration of the status of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on the basis of 
the . . . referendum,”112 indicates, any valid status alteration could only be 
brought about if it is based on a different ground and clearly disconnected 
from the preceding unlawful use of force. Only under such circumstances 
could the (new) “situation” be qualified as not having been created by a 
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